A “secondary agreement” reached in August 1993 on the application of existing domestic labour law, the North American Convention on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) , was severely restricted. With regard to health and safety standards and child labour law, it excluded collective bargaining issues, and its “control teeth” were only accessible at the end of a “long and painful” dispute.  The obligations to enforce existing labour law have also raised questions of democratic practice.  The Canadian anti-NAFTA coalition Pro-Canada Network suggested that guarantees of minimum standards in the absence of “extensive democratic reforms in the [Mexican] courts, unions and government” would be of no use.  However, subsequent evaluations indicated that NAALC`s principles and complaint mechanisms “created a new space for princes to form coalitions and take concrete steps to articulate the challenges of the status quo and promote the interests of workers.”  Fox News reported on December 9, 2019 that negotiators from the three countries reached an agreement on implementation, paving the way for a final agreement within 24 hours and ratification by all three parties before the end of the year. Mexico has agreed to impose a minimum wage of $16 per hour for Mexican auto workers by a “neutral” third party. Mexico, which imports all of its aluminum, also objected to the provisions relating to the U.S. steel and aluminum content of automotive components.  To see the full text of the agreement between the United States, Mexico and Canada, click here. The main objective of the U.S. government for the SPS chapter was to strengthen the scientific basis for SPS measures.
This unique objective promotes both public health and trade and is reflected in the provisions of the SPS chapter as a whole. However, this objective is most directly achieved in the SPS section of risk and science analysis, which requires, for example, parties to withdraw actions that are no longer supported by scientific evidence or risk principles, and to document and provide the opportunity to comment on risk analyses and risk management decisions prior to implementation by the parties. These obligations provide the FDA with the opportunity to work with Canadian and Mexican regulators on scientific and technical issues to ensure the protection of public health while facilitating trade. At the same time, these obligations will not require the FDA to change its current regulatory approach. According to Chad Bown of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the Trump administration`s list “is very consistent with the president`s position on trade barriers that like protectionism. This makes NAFTA less of a free trade agreement in many ways.  The considerations expressed by the U.S. representative regarding subsidized state-owned enterprises and currency manipulation are not likely to apply in Canada and Mexico, but are intended to send a message to countries outside North America.  Jeffrey Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics stated that it was not possible to conclude renegotiations quickly, while alleviating all concerns on the list.  He also said that it would be difficult to do something about trade deficits.  In a 60-minute interview in September 2015, presidential candidate Donald Trump called NAFTA “the worst trade deal ever approved in [the United States]  and said that if elected, he would “renegotiate or we will break it.”   Juan Pablo Castaen [es], chairman of the trade group Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, expressed concern about the renegotiations and the desire to focus on the automotive industry.  A number of trade experts have stated that abandoning NAFTA would have a number of unintended consequences for the United States, including limited access to its key export markets, lower economic growth and higher prices for gasoline, cars, fruits and vegetables.  Members of the private initiative in Mexico noted that many laws must be ad