When the parties negotiate and one or both parties begin to provide services or products, they may reach a point where they have reached an explicit agreement on the essential elements of a contract with sufficient certainty to be legally applicable. Search for: “implicit contract” in Oxford Reference “The earliest studies on the use of implicit contractual models in capital markets consider the existence of credit rationing as part of a risk-sharing of the balance between a bank and its client: the bank is risk neutral and the borrower is risk-averse, this is why they benefit from a long-term relationship by transferring the interest rate risk from the borrower to the bank. If loans are traded on the spot market, the borrower would be exposed to fluctuations in the cash interest rates on the loan. Instead, when the borrower enters into an implied contract with a bank, the bank can protect the borrower from spot market fluctuations by offering a constant interest rate on the credit and in exchange for a higher long-term average interest rate. However, if each bank calculated an interest rate higher than the average spot market rate, there would be credit rationing.  This approach is based on the assumption that agents (banks and borrowers) have different risk parameters. However, recent studies of capital markets are not based on different risk attitudes, but focus on asymmetric information and the risk of default in capital markets. In addition, implicit contracts played an important role in explaining credit rationing under asymmetric information. The banking relationship approach focuses on unfavourable choice, the main consequence of the imperfection of information between lenders and borrowers; But there is also the problem of moral hazard. In general, there are two morality issues related to the capital market. First, borrowers may be lying about their financial situation and not paying off their debts in full.
If the lender could not verify whether the borrower was lying, there could be no credit in the market, especially if the debt is not secured. Second, if, for example, a borrower makes a bad decision leading to bankruptcy, he does not bear the entire error, because part of the costs are borne by the bank that finances the project. As a result, the company will likely make riskier decisions if the investment is financed by a bank than if the investment is financed out of its own pocket. Economists show that these problems could be solved by an implied contract in which the borrower will have to bear certain costs if he has made the debt insolvent. The cost of the borrower`s default may be the cost of hiring lawyers and accountants to convince the lender of its emergency financial situation, exclusion from the capital market and future loans or economic penalties if the borrower is a country.  However, since some of these costs will reduce the amount that will be recognized for the lender in the event of bankruptcy, the expected return is lower than that of moral risk problems. As a result, the level of investment would also be lower, which would lead to loan rationing at the loan level. If one party is driven on the way to the garden and the other party renounces the agreements made by its behavior, the situation is ripe for tacit agreement. You cannot identify an explicit agreement in business relationships (see the different types of express contract above: oral/written/partially oral, partly in writing).